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CASES NOTED
THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT INTERPRETS RULE lOb-5
Plaintiff, the Securities & Exchange Commission [hereinafter SEC],
attacked a merger of insurance companies for violation of commission
rule 10b-5 by misrepresentations and omissions in the proxy statement.
Plaintiff's suit to enjoin resulted from the action of defendant, National
Securities, Inc., which, having purchased control of Producers Life In-
surance Co., sought shareholder approval of a merger between the two
companies by sending communications to Producers' shareholders. These
communications failed to disclose a plan for the surviving company to
assume certain obligations which National Securities had undertaken as
part of the consideration for its purchases of Producers' stock. The SEC
was denied temporary relief. Shortly thereafter, Producers' shareholders
and the Arizona Director of Insurance approved the merger. The SEC
amended its complaint, but its attempt to unwind the merger resulted in
an adverse judgment on the pleadings. The court construed the com-
plaint as seeking to undo a merger approved by the state director of
insurance, pursuant to a state statute requiring his approval of a pro-
posed merger unless he found it contrary to law or inequitable or detri-
mental to stockholders.1
On appeal to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, held, affirmed: To
invalidate the corporate merger, already approved by the Arizona Direc-
tor of Insurance pursuant to Arizona Revised Statute § 20-731, would
at least "impair" if not "invalidate" or "supersede" laws enacted by the
State of Arizona "for the purpose of regulating the business of insurance,"
within the meaning of the applicable provisions of the McCarran-Fergu-
son Act.'
Because of the importance of 'the questions raised by the administra-
tion of securities laws, the Supreme Court of the United States granted
certiorari and held, reversed and remanded: By regulating the relation-
ship between a stockholder and the company in which he owns stock,
Arizona was regulating securities and not the business of insurance. Such
regulation is not within the scope of the McCarran-Ferguson Act. Se-
curities & Exchange Commission v. National Securities, Inc., 393 U.S.
453 (1969).
Although the Supreme Court ruled that the McCarran-Ferguson
Act did not bar a federal remedy attempting to protect security holders
from fraudulent misrepresentations,' it is not on account of this ruling
that National Securities assumes its importance. Rather, it is because for
1. Securities & Exchange Coamm'n v. National Securities, Inc., 252 F. Supp. 623 (D.Ariz.
1966).
2. Securities & Exchange Comm'n v. National Securities, Inc., 387 F.2d 25 (9th Cir.
1967); McCarran-Ferguson Act, 59 Stat. 34 (1945), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 1012(b) (1964).
3. Securities & Exchange Comm'n v. National Securities, Inc., 393 U.S. 453, 89 S. Ct.
564 (1969) [hereinafter cited as SEC v. Nat'l Securities].
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the first time the Court chose to interpret rule lOb-5,' probably the most
litigated provision in the federal securities laws, even though it was not
called upon to do so. 5 Despite the fact that rule lob-5 was not argued,
the Supreme Court probably chose to interpret it because of the growing
criticism directed at the rule,6 and because of the opportunity to express
itself by means of a clarification of the two relatively clear-cut issues in
this case. In this connection, the holdings are (1) that mergers do con-
stitute a "purchase or sale" in the context of lOb-5, 7 and (2) that lOb-5
does cover misrepresentations which occur in connection with proxy so-
licitations.8 Before discussion of the development of each of these hold-
ings, it would be well to examine how rule 10b-5 was adopted and how
the SEC originally interpreted it.
One commentator has described the beginning of 10b-5 thusly.9 In
1942, a problem came to the attention of staff members in the Philadel-
phia regional office of the SEC. The problem involved a stockholder who
was intentionally disseminating false bad news about his company in an
effort to buy its shares cheaply. Although the general feeling in the office
was that the SEC should be able to move against the individual, it was
foreclosed: section 17(a) 10 of the Securities Act of 1933 could not be
used because it applied only to sales of securities-not purchases. Also,
it could not use section 10(b)" of the Securities Exchange Act as it be-
4. Rule 10b-5, 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1968), provides:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any means
or instrumentality of inter-state commerce, or of the mails or of any facility of
any national securities exchange,
(a) To employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud,
(b) To make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state a
material fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in the light of
the circumstances under which they were made, not misleading, or
(c) To engage in any act, practice, or cause of business which operates or would
operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person, in connection with the purchase
or sale of any security.
5. See Justice Harlan's dissent, in which he states that not only was the issue not
discussed by the court of appeals but the only issue raised by the Government in its petition
for certiorari was "whether the McCarran-Ferguson Act . . . precludes the application of
the anti-fraud provisions of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. . . ." 89 S. Ct. at 573.
Furthermore, he states that when respondents' brief on the merits argued that 10b-5 did
not apply to the present case, the Solicitor General did not even attempt to present the
Government's position on that score because he believed that "the question is not appropri-
ately before this Court for decision." 89 S. Ct. at 573.
6. See Painter, Inside Information: Growing Pains for the Development of Federal
Corporation Law Under Rule lob-5, 65 COLum. L. REv. 1361 (1965); Ruder, Pitfalls in
the Development of a Federal Law of Corporations by Implication Through Rule 10b-5,
59 Nw. U.L. REv. 185 (1964).
7. SEC v. National Securities, Inc., 89 S. Ct. at 572.
8. SEC v. National Securities, Inc., 89 S. Ct. at 573.
9. Manne, Insider Trading and the Administrative Process, 35 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 473
(1967). Manne's account is taken from remarks by Milton V. Freeman of the District of
Columbia Bar, Conference on Codification of the Federal Securities Laws, sponsored by
the Committee on Federal Regulation of the Section of Corporation, Banking and Business
Law of the American Bar Association, Chicago, Ill., Nov. 19, 1966, copy on file at the
George Washington Law Review.
10. Securities Act of 1933, § 17(a), 48 Stat. 84, as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 77(q) (1964).
11. Securities Act of 1934, § 10(b), 48 Stat. 891, as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 78(j) (1964).
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came operative under rules and regulations promulgated by the Commis-
sion, because there were none in point. The following morning a member
of the Philadelphia staff presented to the full Commission for its con-
sideration what is now rule 10b-5. The rule and press release 12 were dis-
tributed to each member of the Commission. The sole response was by
Commissioner Sumner T. Pike who inquired rhetorically, "Well, we are
against fraud, aren't we?" The rule was unanimously adopted.
According to the Commission, rule 10b-5 was promulgated by the
SEC in order to execute section 10(b)' 8 of the Exchange Act and close
"a loophole in the protection against fraud."' 4 The purpose was to give
the SEC substantive provisions upon which to act under section 21,"5
since section 10(b) was not self-executing. One year after that day in
1942, the SEC discussed the rule in Ward La France Truck Corp.,'6 and
concluded:
[T]here was a clear necessity, [to negate any] unfair advantage
over shareholders, for the issuer and those in control to make
timely disclosure of the identity of the purchaser, of improved
financial and operating condition of the issuer, and of the full
terms of the transfer to Salta [the seller] of the Truck Corpo-
ration's business and of its liquidation.'
Nothing else even vaguely suggestive of analysis appears in the opinions;
this case is the sum and substance of early SEC interpretations of rule
10b-5. There has been little detailed analysis in the judicial history of
10b-5,8 but because of the overwhelming importance of this vaguely
12. The Securities and Exchange Commission today announced the adoption of a
rule prohibiting fraud by any person in connection with the purchase of securities.
The previously existing rules against fraud in the purchase of securities applied
only to broker-dealers. The new rule closes a loophole in the protections against
fraud administered by the Commission by prohibiting individuals or companies
from buying securities if they engage in fraud in their purchase.
SEC Securities Act Release No. 3230 (May 21, 1942).
13. Securities Act of 1934, § 10(b), 48 Stat. 891, as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 78(j) (1964),
provides:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any means
or instrumentality of interstate commerce or of the mails, or of any facility of
any national securities exchange-
(b) To use or employ, in connection with the purchase or sale of any security
registered on a national securities exchange or any security not so registered, any
manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance in contravention of such rules
and regulations as the Commission may prescribe as necessary or appropriate in
the public interest or for the protection of investors.
14. Note 10 supra.
15. 48 Stat. 899 (1934), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 78(u) (1964). Section 21 empowers
the Commission to enforce all sections of the Act through investigative, administrative, and
injunctive proceedings.
16. 13 SEC 373 (1943). The facts were similar to those that had originally generated
rule 1ob-5, except that the purchaser was the corporation rather than the individual who
controlled it.
17. Id. at 381.
18. H. MANNE, INSIDER TRADING & STOCK MARKET 10-15 (1966).
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worded commission rule it was most important for the Court to begin
interpreting it.
The first holding of the instant case, to the effect that a merger is a
purchase and sale for purposes of 10b-5, is not surprising; the tendency
has been this way for some time. Mergers, including consolidations and
sales of assets for securities, are undoubtedly the most common direct
impersonal transactions except for cash sales, yet they have generated
but little lOb-5 law. One of the reasons for the quiescence of 10b-5 in
this area is the arms-length bargaining and careful examination that ac-
company mergers between independent entities; it is hardly a coincidence
that most of the mergers in the few relevant 10b-5 cases are short-form
rather than arms'-length, and without shareholder vote. 9 Another reason
is the applicability of the proxy rules, which embody (in addition to
itemized disclosure requirements) a similar concept of fraud" and power-
ful implied rights of action.2 ' However, if the proxy rules are inapplicable
or if the fraud is not in the proxy statement but solely in some other
phase of the transaction, 10b-5 should be operative.
In two recent cases, the Courts of Appeal for the Second2 2 and
Seventh Circuits23 have held that a merger involves a purchase and sale
of securities for purposes of section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange
Act of 193424 and rule lOb-5 of the General Rules and Regulations Un-
der the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.25 These decisions, and the in-
stant case, represent the culmination of a recent line of decisions which
finally extended 10(b) protection to merger situations after years of
vacillation by the SEC.
In 1935 the SEC, in the note to rule 5 of form E-1, the form for
most registrations, took the position that for registration purposes there
was "no sale" to shareholders when a statutory merger or consolidation
was approved by vote of the shareholders.26 By 1943, the Commission
was apparently of the view that a merger or consolidation did not in-
volve a sale for any purpose, including the anti-fraud provisions. This
19. A. BROMBERG, SECUtITES LAW: FRAUD-SEC. RuiL 10B-5, § 6.3(2), 117-18 n.n.31-
35 (1969).
20. SEC Rule 14a-9(a), 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-9(a) (1968):
No solicitation subject to this regulation shall be made by means of any proxy
statement . . . or other communication, written or oral, containing any statement
which, at the time and in the light of the circumstances under which it is made,
is false or misleading with respect to any material fact, or which omits to state
any material fact necessary in order to make the statements therein not false or
misleading. ....
This is the substance of clause 2 in 10b-5.
21. J. I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426 (1964).
22. Vine v. Beneficial Fin. Co., 374 F.2d 627 (2d Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 389 U.S.
970 (1967).
23. Dasho v. Susquehanna Corp., 380 F.2d 262 (7th Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 389 U.S.
977 (1967).
24. 15 U.S.C. § 78(j)(b) (1964).
25. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1968).
26. SEC Securities Act Release No. 493(c) (Sept. 20, 1935).
27. In National Supply Co. v. Leland Stanford Jr. Univ., 134 F.2d 689 (9th Cir. 1943),
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policy was formalized once again in 1951, when the Commission adopted
rule 133 of the General Rules and Regulations Under the Security Act
of 1933.2 This rule specifically provides that a statutory merger or con-
solidation shall not involve a sale for "purposes ...of section 5 of the
Act [the registration provisions]."" The Commission expressly provided
that as a matter of statutory construction it does not deem the "no sale
theory," which is described in the rule, as being applicable for purposes
of any of the anti-fraud provisions of the Securities Act of 1933 and the
Securities and Exchange Act of 1934.0 Although the Commission did not
expressly argue that such a transaction should be considered a sale, this
was the interpretation placed on the new rule and commentary by at least
one text writer.3
In any event, the SEC is now squarely in favor of applying section
10(b) and rule 10b-5 to these situations.32 The reason for the change of
position seems to stem from a realization, acquired over years of admin-
istrative experience, that there is a great opportunity to defraud investors
by use of corporate mergers. Although the SEC has been criticized for
the basic inconsistency, 3 the Commission's present position with respect
to the anti-fraud provisions is in accord with the intent of section 10(b).
The purpose of enacting section 10(b) and adopting rule 10b-5 was to
enlarge the provisions of section 17(a) of the 1933 Act so as to prohibit
fraud in connection with the "sale" as well as the "purchase" of securi-
ties. 4
Despite the SEC's struggle with the question, the problem presented
here received little judicial consideration prior to the instant and the two
aforementioned cases.
In 1943, when a similar question was presented in the case of
National Supply Co. v. Leland Stanford Junior Univ., 3 the Ninth Circuit
indicated that a consolidation did not involve a sale of securities or an
exchange amounting to a sale, thus agreeing with the then current posi-
tion of the SEC that a consolidation was not a sale for purposes of section
10(b)." Then in 1960, in H. L. Green Co. v. Childree,"7 a district court
cert. denied, 320 U.S. 773 (1943), the Commission filed an amicus curiae brief expressing
its opinion that a consolidation did not involve a sale. Id. at 694.
28. SEC Securities Act Release No. 3420 (Aug. 2, 1951).
29. 17 C.F.R. § 230.133 (1968). This is the "no sale" theory of the Commission.
30. SEC Securities Act Release No. 3420 (Aug. 2, 1951).
31. I L. Loss, SEcukITI REGULATIONs 524n.17 (2d ed. 1961).
32. Brief for SEC as Amicus Curiae at 5, Vine v. Beneficial Fin. Co., 374 F.2d 627
(2d Cir. 1967); Brief for SEC as Amicus Curiae at 6-28, Dasho v. Susquehanna Corp.,
380 F.2d 262 (7th Cir. 1967).
33. I L. Loss, supra note 37, at 522.
34. Dasho v. Susquehanna Corp., 380 F.2d 262, 266 (7th Cir. 1967) ; Hooper v. Moun-
tain States Sec. Corp., 282 F.2d 195, 201 (5th Cir. 1960), cert. denied, 365 U.S. 814 (1961).
35. 134 F.2d 689 (9th Cir. 1943), cert. denied, 320 U.S. 773 (1943).
36. Id. at 694.
37. 185 F. Supp. 95 (S.D.N.Y. 1960). This case involved an action in which a corpo-
ration alleged that it had been fraudulently induced to issue shares pursuant to a plan
of merger.
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said in its decision that a merger "may or may not involve a purchase and
sale" within section 10(b).18 More recently, Simon v. New Haven Board
& Carton Company89 allowed a derivative action involving a merger trans-
action to be brought under section 10(b). The court said that a corporate
issuance of stock is a "sale" within the meaning of the rule that provides
that it is unlawful to engage in any act, practice or course of business
which operates or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person in
connection with a purchase or "sale" of any security. °
In 1963, the Seventh Circuit considered an attack on a merger where
a violation of section 10(b) of the Exchange Act, among other things,
had been alleged, but the opinion sets forth no distinct holding that a
statutory merger is not a sale under the Securities and Exchange Acts. 1
Voege v. American Sumatra Tobacco Corp.42 is a holding by a district
court that a merger is a sale under section 10(b). In this case the plain-
tiff was allowed to bring an individual action as a seller although she did
not accept the tender offer. The rationale used by the court was that a
sale includes a contract to sell,48 and the corporate charter is a contract
to sell since it requires a shareholder to accept in exchange whatever cash
or securities may be offered in a merger.
Vine v. Beneficial Finance Co. 4 and Dasho v. Susquehanna Corp.45
provided the first thorough discussions of the problem at the appellate
level. Vine allowed the plaintiff to bring an action on his own behalf, on
the theory that there was a "constructive" sale of plaintiff's securities
within the meaning of section 10(b) and rule 10b-5 when the merger was
consummated without his consent.4 6 The court reasoned that once the
merger was consummated plaintiff's shares were in effect frozen. There-
fore, in order to realize any value for them, he would eventually have to
exchange them for cash either by accepting Beneficial's offer under the
merger agreement or by pursuing his rights to an appraisal. Since the
allegedly fraudulent merger placed the plaintiff in this inextricable posi-
tion the court dispensed with the "needless formality" of having to ac-
tually exchange his shares in order to become a seller, and construed the
definition of "sale" in section 3 (a) to include this plaintiff.
In Dasho,47 the district court attempted to distinguish a sale of
shares from a merger by saying that a merger is an automatic involuntary
conversion of one type of security for another, whereas a sale requires a
38. Id. at 96.
39. 250 F. Supp. 297 (D. Conn. 1966).
40. Id. at 298.
41. Borak v. J. I. Case Co., 317 F.2d 838, 847 (7th Cir. 1963), aff'd, 377 U.S. 426
(1964).
42. 241 F. Supp. 369 (D. Del. 1965).
43. Securities Exchange Act § 3(a)(14), 15 U.S.C. § 78(c)(a) (1964).
44. 374 F.2d 627 (2d Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 970 (1967).
45. 380 F.2d 262 (7th Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 977 (1967).
46. 374 F.2d 627, 634 (2d Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 970 (1967).
47. Dasho v. Susquehanna Corp., 267 F. Supp. 508, 511, 514-15 (N.D. I1. 1966), rev'd,
380 F.2d 262 (7th Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 977 (1967).
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volitional act.4" The court of appeals disposed of this argument by con-
cluding that the district court was unduly impressed by semantic and
conceptual difficulties. 9 The court stated that the broad definition given
the words "purchase" and "sale" in the anti-fraud provisions of the
Securities Exchange Act indicated an intention that the words were not
to be limited to transactions ordinarily governed by commercial law. 0
In the instant case, respondents argued that the complaint failed to
allege any misstatement "in connection with the purchase or sale of any
security" relying on the "no-sale doctrine."'" It is clear that a merger or
similar transaction entails a sale52 and presumably, a corresponding pur-
chase for the 1933 Act. Securities Act rule 133 (no sale), which excludes
mergers and related transactions from the definition of "sale," is care-
fully restricted to the registration and related requirements of Securities
Act § 5 and does not cover the fraud provisions. 8 The test used by the
Court was whether the alleged conduct was the type of fraudulent be-
havior which was meant to be forbidden by the Statute and the rule. 4
The deception in the instant case furthered a scheme which resulted in
Producers' shareholders losing their status in that company and becoming
shareholders in a new company. Moreover, by voting in favor of the
merger, each approving shareholder individually lost any rights under
Arizona law to obtain an appraisal of his stock and payment for it in
cash. Therefore, the Court was correct in stating that the deception
affected individual shareholders' decisions in ways not at all unlike those
involved in a typical cash sale or share exchange,55 which would be
covered by the anti-fraud provisions.
The second holding, by which the Court applied 10b-5 to proxy
solicitation, is rather surprising in view of the fact that in section 14 (a)56
of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, Congress specifically authorized
the SEC to develop and enforce rules governing proxy solicitations. 7
section 14(a), like 10b-5, was one of the vehicles through which Con-
gress sought greater protection for the private investor.
Prior to the adoption of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, essen-
tially the entire proxy field was left to the frail framework provided by
state law. Indeed, most state corporate statutes merely authorized the
use of proxies. Once past this statutory authorization, there was-and
48. Id. at 511.
49. 380 F.2d 262, 267 (7th Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 977 (1967).
50. Id. at 266. The court also stated that it was impressed by the argument of the
Commission that the proposed merger of Gypsum into Susquehanna involved both a
purchase (the acquisition by Susquehanna of 435,000 shares of its own stock) and a sale
(the issuance of Susquehanna shares to Gypsum shareholders by Susquehanna).
51. SEC v. National Securities, Inc., 89 S. Ct. at 571.
52. A. BROMBERG, supra note 19, at § 6.5(2), 138.2 n.95 (1969).
53. SEC Securities Act Release No. 2059 (July 13, 1961).
54. SEC v. National Securities, 89 S. Ct. at 572.
55. Id.
56. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, ch. 404 § 14(a), 48 Stat. 895 (1934), as amended,
15 U.S.C. § 78(u)(a) (1964).
57. II L. Loss, SacuaRsias REGULATION 857-66 (2d ed. 1961).
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still is-virtually no state case law to guide anyone through the maze of
problems that arise in even normal proxy solicitation situations. Not only
was there an absence of state law, but prior to the 1934 Act proxy solici-
tation methods of many publicly held companies were materially if not
totally deficient. During this period, the average shareholder received an
annual proxy card printed in small type which was so broad as to permit
management to take almost any type of action it desired.5" As a result of
these deficiencies, Congress adopted section 14(a) of the 1934 Act, 9
which gave broad powers to the Commission to adopt rules governing the
solicitation of proxies as may be necessary or appropriate in the public
interest or for the protection of investors. When the Commission adopted
its first proxy regulations under section 14(a) in 1935, it marked the
beginning of a totally new body of substantive and procedural law with
respect to the solicitation of proxies."
The purpose of section [14] to the Commission rules ...is
to provide shareholders with an opportunity to exercise their
corporate franchise on the basis of accurate and adequate in-
formation .61
While the proxy rules adopted by the Commission went as far as
they could, the Act failed to grant the Commission authority to regulate
solicitation of proxies of securities traded over the counter. However, by
virtue of the significant 1964 Amendments to the Securities Exchange
Act of 1934, proxy regulatory control was extended to certain over-the-
counter securities.S Although these amendments were not in effect at the
time of the conduct charged in the instant case, the Court made it clear
that, even if they were in effect, lob-5 would control. In the words of the
Court: "But the existence or nonexistence of regulation under section 14
would not affect the scope of section 10(b) and rule 1Ob-5. ' '63
Judicial decisions concerning the overlap of rule lob-5 and section
14(a) are few in number, and despite some hesitant judicial language
there has been no serious challenge to the position taken now by the
Supreme Court. 4 Although there was probably nothing to prevent 10b-5
from being used when the proxy rules were also applicable, the question
remained open until now.
58. H.R. Rep. No. 1383, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 13-14 (1934), cited in Von Mehren &
McCarroll, The Proxy Rules: A Case Study in the Administrative Process, 29 LAW &
CONTFMP. PROB. 728 n.2 (1964).
59. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 14(a), 15 U.S.C. § 78(n) (a) (1964).
60. SEC Securities Act Release No. 378 (Aug. 21, 1935); E. ARANOW & H. EINHORN,
PROXY CONTESTS FOR CORPORATE CONTROL 81-84 (1957).
61. Statement of The Securities & Exchange Commission with Respect to Proposed
Amendments, Hearings Before a Subcommittee of the Senate Committee on Banking &
Currency on S. 1642, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. 389 (1963).
62. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 14(a), as amended, 78 Stat. 569 (1964), 15
U.S.C. § 78(u)(a) (1965).
63. SEC v. National Securities 89 S. Ct. at 573.
64. For a summary of holdings under the proxy rules, see Sowards & Mofsky, Federal
Proxy Regulation: Recent Extension of Controls, 41 ST. JoHN's L. Rxv. 165, 212-16 (1966).
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Although the Supreme Court did not deal with this question in
Borak,65 the court of appeals left the issue open, expressly stating that no
opinion would be given as to whether misleading proxy material may con-
stitute manipulative or deceptive practices within the prohibition of Se-
curities Exchange Act section 10(b). 6"
A series of cases originating from the Southern District of New York
has shed some light on the issue but that court has not remained con-
sistent. The first case in the series involved a situation of an allegedly
fraudulent transaction in securities between a corporation and its man-
agement, in which the use of the mails to send notices of stockholders
meetings and letters concerning corporate activities, designed to facilitate
the sale of the securities, was held sufficient to serve as the jurisdictional
basis for a derivative action under rule, 10b-5. A year later, in Barnett
v. Anaconda Co.,6 Judge Bryan regarded as an open question whether
fraud in proxy statements could constitute a violation of section 10(b),
as distinct from a violation of section 14(a). Simon v. The New Haven
Board and Carton Co.,69 although not one of the series, represents pos-
sibly the first square and considered holding that a rule 10b-5 derivative
cause of action will lie when a corporation is caused to issue stock in a
merger authorized by shareholders as a result of deceptive proxy mate-
rial. In Richland v. Crandall70 the court considered, but found it unneces-
sary to decide, whether 10b-5 applied to proxy materials within the proxy
rules. Although the court noted the "similarity"' of proof under 10b-5
and the proxy rules, it brought to light an important distinction when it
said that under section 10(b), a plaintiff must show an intent to defraud,
or at least guilty knowledge, on the part of the directors, whereas under
section 14(a) the use of any proxy statement that is false or misleading
with respect to any material fact is outlawed.72 Finally, in Miller v. Stein-
bach,7 in which the contention was a proxy statement was false and mis-
leading for failure to disclose that merger negotiations were being con-
ducted, the court declined to dismiss the 1Ob-5 claim after finding a cause
of action stated under the proxy rules.74
There is no doubt that stocks and bonds issued by insurance com-
panies are securities for purposes of the SEC statutes. 75 In view of the
great similarity of the definitions of "security" in the 1933 and 1934
65. J. I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426 (1964).
66. Borak v. J. I. Case Co., 317 F.2d 838, 846-47 (7th Cir. 1963), af'd on other
grounds, 377 U.S. 426 (1964).
67. Kane v. Central American Mining & Oil, Inc., 235 F. Supp. 559 (S.D.N.Y. 1964).
68. 238 F. Supp. 766 (S.D.N.Y 1965).
69. 250 F. Supp. 297 (D. Conn. 1966).
70. 262 F. Supp. 538, 552-53 (S.D.N.Y. 1967).
71. Id. at 553.
72. Id.
73. 268 F. Supp. 255 (S.D.N.Y. 1967).
74. Id. at 278-79.
75. See I L. Loss, SECuRITIEs REGuLATioNs 496-500 (2d ed. 1961).
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Acts, Securities Act § 2 (1),76 and Securities Exchange Act § 3 (a) (10) ,77
the anti-fraud provisions of both Acts, including 10b-5, should therefore
be applicable to securities of insurance companies. A more difficult ques-
tion, however, was the one presented in the instant case-whether 10b-5,
though generally applicable to insurance companies, should be applied to
insurance company proxy statements, or for that matter any other proxy
statements, in the face of express authorization by Congress to the SEC
in section 14(a) to regulate proxy matters. Given the federal commit-
ment to investor protection, the Supreme Court had, in the author's
opinion, a respectable basis for using 10b-5 to cover proxy statements.
Rule 10b-5, which has come to be known as "the SEC fraud rule,) 7 S
should have had careful and rigorous analysis, investigation, and disdus-
sion by expert individuals capable of recognizing the economic and fi-
nancial ramifications of a broadly based fiduciary concept. Such treatment
is nowhere apparent in the history of rule 10b-5, 7' but hopefully the
Supreme Court's decision in the instant case will be the start of the long
awaited unravelling of this highly complicated and technical rule.
RODNEY MANDELSTAM
76. "The term 'security' is defined in sufficiently broad and general terms so as to
include within that definition the many types of instruments that within our commercial
world fall within the ordinary concept of security." H.R. Rep. No. 85, 73d Cong., 1st Sess.
11 (1933).
77. Cf. Section 3(a)(14) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78(c)(a)
(1964).
78. III L. Loss, SECURTIES REGULATIONS 1474-81 (2d ed. 1961).
79. H. MANNE, INSIDER TRADING AND STOCK MARKET 10-15 (1966).
